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Highlights
The consequences of the new banking resolution regime on 
the evolution of the European financial system were discussed 
at a Chatham House ‘Executive Seminar on Banking Resolu-
tion’ organized by the Florence School of Banking and Finance 
and held in Florence on 14-15 July 2016. The executive seminar 
brought together academics, EU policy-makers, investors, and 
industry practitioners to discuss the impact of the new resolu-
tion regime on banks, regulators and investors. Participants also 
exchanged views on liquidity support and exit strategies in the 
upcoming resolution phase.
The main conclusions stemming from the interaction among 
panelists are the following:
1. Most of the systemic institutions still need to improve their 
internal governance in order to be in line with what is consid-
ered international best practice;
2. Despite some criticisms and unresolved issues, bail-in repre-
sents a clear and radical improvement from the government 
bail-outs that followed the Eurozone crisis;
3. Information disclosure to large investors is a major upcoming 
challenge posed by resolution;
4. A deeper assessment of the liquidity available for resolution 
needs to be carried out.
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Background
Following the disorderly government bail-outs of trou-
bled banks during the Eurozone crisis, the EU adopted 
the Bank Recovery & Resolution Directive (BRRD) in 
2014 to resolve systemically important banks that were 
failing or likely to fail.
The adoption of the BRRD sets new standards in the way 
bank failure will be dealt with in the immediate future, 
putting an end to the disorderly bail-outs era and making 
shareholders fully responsible for their investment deci-
sions. The disruptive effects of bail-outs on the financial 
system, on the one side, and their spill-over effects to the 
real economy, on the other, have, in fact, highlighted the 
urgency to respond to the inefficiencies and costs that 
bail-outs impose on excessive risk-taking, on the sudden 
stops to credit intermediation, as well as on the public 
finances of EU-countries.
Equipped with tools for precautionary and early interven-
tion, the BRRD has thus been designed to attain two main 
goals: first, to restructure failing or likely to fail banks to 
“ensure the continuity of their critical functions” in the 
economy while they are being restructured; second, and 
contemporaneously, to limit through market discipline 
the moral-hazard effects on banks’ risk-taking decisions.
Enforced as of 1st January 2016 by the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB) and National Resolution Authorities, the 
BRRD has been designed with the two-handed scope of 
increasing both financial markets’ ex-ante and ex-post 
efficiency. On the one hand, regulators claimed that bail-
in will change banks’ risk-taking decisions, which will 
no longer be affected by the implicit and unsustainable 
government guarantee that taxpayers’ money will be used 
to bail-out troubled-banks. On the other hand, regula-
tors also acknowledged that resolution prevents orderly 
liquidation and interruption of critical functions in sys-
temically important banks, limiting disruptive effects to 
the financial system and possible spillovers to the real 
economy.
Implications of Resolution for Internal 
Governance of Financial Institutions 
The first panel highlighted the implications and chal-
lenges that new resolution regimes entail for internal gov-
ernance of financial institutions and, more specifically, 
for the way financial institutions manage their business 
models and target their risk appetite. The main points 
raised by participants concerned the necessity of greater 
information and transparency, and the need for the inclu-
sion of other stakeholders than investors in banks’ deci-
sion making processes as a precondition for resolution.
The panel opened with a remark on the first in-depth 
assessment carried out by the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism (SSM)1 on two main issues:
a) the compliance of banks’ internal governance with 
both the national and the European legislation; 
b) its consistency with the best international practices. 
Participants discussed the results of this SSM assessment 
and  converged on agreeing that future developments 
of the BRRD will be needed to carry out improvements 
in three main areas: the removal of information asym-
metries that still characterize the information flow in 
decision-taking organs; the optimal design of govern-
ment bodies’ characteristics, which should reflect inde-
pendence, dedication, and professional qualification of 
its members; the harmonization and integration of the 
EU regulations with national laws. 
Participants moved then to discuss some legal aspects of 
resolution, addressing the urgency of greater clarity in the 
context of financial support between banks and subsidi-
aries within cross-borders banking groups. Panelists sug-
gested that, although the BRRD (art. 19 and seq.) foresees 
the possibility, and not the obligation, of banks’ financial 
support to a failing subsidiary – an approach known as 
“Rozenblum Doctrine” – the rules on consolidated super-
vision and capital requirements suggest a possible future 
shift towards an outright duty to support failing subsidi-
aries. Panelists stressed that this shift could potentially 
lead to backfiring effects on the stability of the whole 
financial system, as an outright duty to support a failing 
1.  SSM supervisory statement on governance and risk appetite, ECB, June 
2016. https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm_su-
pervisory_statement_on_governance_and_risk_appetite_201606.
en.pdf
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subsidiary could trigger even greater bankruptcy risks 
that would be scaled up to the parent bank. Furthermore, 
the panel discussed whether the BRRD has changed the 
balance of powers between banks, their shareholders and 
creditors. Participants claimed that bail-in has put credi-
tors into a much more likely possibility of losing part of 
their money, shifting negotiations between banks and 
their creditors in the shadow of a less friendly law. 
Panelists finally highlighted that the future challenge of 
the BRRD will be to raise the convergence of interests 
between shareholders and other banks’ stakeholders in 
order to ease resolution. They argued that this could be 
carried out in three steps: 
a) by reducing the failures of knowledge or comprehen-
sions within the internal governance of banks;
b) by dealing with the failures of banks’ willingness to 
comply with the resolution authority;
c) by coping with the failures of banks’ capacity to 
comply with the resolution authority.
As for the failure of knowledge within the internal gov-
ernance, participants stressed the urge to align banks’ 
business areas with their legal entities, by implementing a 
clear booking model, as well as clear intragroup relation-
ships. Furthermore, they highlighted the need to remove 
the presence of asymmetric information between share-
holders and credit holders when it comes to defining 
banks’ risk appetite and, more generally, to include credit 
holders in the decision making process of banks. Indeed, 
in order to be effective, the inclusion of creditors’ inter-
ests needs to be timely and efficient. As for the concerns 
over the failures on the willingness to comply, instead, 
participants stressed the need for an independent board 
composition and an incentive-consistent capital struc-
ture within groups, both geared towards a government 
structure characterized by debt investors playing the new 
role of market discipline providers. Finally, participants 
agreed that failures of banks’ capacity to comply with res-
olution authorities cries for the need of defining adequate 
internal loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC), greater skills 
for the board of directors, and a more detailed scenario 
testing. 
 
Implications of the New Resolution 
Regimes for Regulators 
The second panel shifted its focus from the internal gov-
ernance issues to the challenges that the BRRD left to reg-
ulators. The two main points considered were the bail-in/
bail-out dichotomy and the issue of credibility within the 
current resolution framework.
The panel started with a discussion on the reasons that 
brought the BRRD to include bail-in rules in banking res-
olution, as a response to the massive bail-outs witnessed 
in the recent Eurozone crisis. The need for a change came 
from the widespread consideration that “bail-outs have 
been an economic success, but a political failure”2, which 
urged the authorities to respond by means of a new set of 
regulations. The challenges that the new bail-in scheme, 
embedded within the BRRD, had to address were to:
a) deal with the perverse effects of using tax-payers’ 
money to subsidize banks’ excessive risk-taking; 
b) endeavor to break the unsustainable sovereign/bank 
“doom-loop”; 
c) avoid the social costs of liquidating systemic banks.
The failure and liquidation of troubled-banks would 
result, in fact, in spillovers to the real economy, ampli-
fying the initial effects of a financial crisis. Although 
many participants agreed on the necessity of a change 
from bail-out practices, different voices raised when par-
ticipants discussed issues that the current bail-in regula-
tion poses to regulators. 
A first set of issues concerned the contagion effects 
that bail-in might lead to. Participants suggested that, 
although bail-in increases credit holders’ monitoring 
efforts, bail-inable debt could be dangerously accumu-
lated by pension funds, insurance companies or other 
undercapitalized banks which, if resolution is triggered, 
could encounter solvency problems, leading to a con-
tagion effect throughout the whole financial system. In 
other words, unless clear rules are set on whom can hold 
bail-inable debt and to which extent, the current resolu-
tion framework might destabilize financial markets. 
2. Although many participants agreed that the bail-outs carried out during 
the Eurozone crisis have been widely recognized as a political failure, 
fewer agreed on the extent to which bail-outs were an economic success.
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A second set of issues focused on the credibility of the 
bail-in scheme. The matter of credibility arises from a rel-
evant discretion over the decision to put a bank into reso-
lution and it increases financial markets’ uncertainty. On 
the one hand, participants claimed that excessive political 
discretion might lead to time-inconsistent behaviours 
of governments in the absence of a credible liquidity 
backstop. On the other hand, though, a mandatory bail-
in according to an established waterfall and rigid rules 
would neither be desirable nor credible as the framework 
would have to account for systemic exceptions.
A third set of issues concerned asset valuation and the 
related time frame that the assessment of non-per-
forming-loans (NPL) would have to take. Participants 
suggested that traded financial market instruments, such 
as bail-inable debt, ask for a rapid response to informa-
tion flow and to higher uncertainty, while valuation of 
NPL would take a much longer time frame (months prob-
ably) which would, in turn, decrease the value of equity. 
Moreover, a longer time horizon needed for valuation 
and greater uncertainty would result in higher funding 
costs for banks.
Participants also added that bail-outs in the future will 
still be possible and desirable, although bail-in would 
have to be implemented first. The system moved from a 
bail-out-only regime to a bail-in-only one, although par-
ticipants believe that a future convergence to a mix of the 
two, given the difficulties to fully implement the latter 
one, will be possible and desirable. 
Finally, participants claimed that regulators and authori-
ties should consider an additional possible way of 
reducing resolution costs, that is implementing higher 
capital requirements. Providing banks with a larger buffer 
of equity to weather against losses constitutes a third and 
less explored solution.
 
Implication of the new resolution regime 
for investors 
The third panel discussed the effects that the new resolu-
tion regime had on investors and was mainly focused on 
the key role played by information disclosure.  As losses 
can by no means be legislated away, but at most shared 
within a resolution framework, participants highlighted 
the importance of reducing asymmetries and increasing 
disclosure of information affecting those rules that dictate 
how losses should be shared among banks’ stakeholders. 
The panel thus stressed how investors are aiming for 
clearer and greater information as a compelling condi-
tion for their investment decisions in the next future. The 
discussion covered different types of additional informa-
tion required, which can be declined in three main areas: 
a) greater information over the resolution hierarchy;
b) greater predictability of resolution;
c) greater harmonization of rules.
As for point a), participants claimed that investors are 
in desperate need for clearer information regarding the 
level on which they position themselves within the debt 
hierarchy, should the bank fall under resolution. This 
would allow them to price risks more clearly, lowering 
the premium they require on lending and simplifying 
transactions when debt securities are traded. Moreover, 
as mentioned already in the previous panels, participants 
also stated how crucial it is for investors to have a greater 
predictability of when and under what conditions bail-in 
can be triggered by the authorities. Although participants 
agreed that leaving some discretionality to the resolu-
tion authorities can be indeed desirable, they also believe 
that one of the BRRD’s future challenges will be to reduce 
investors’ uncertainty by lowering the current level of 
resolution unpredictability. On this same topic they also 
stressed that by no means discretion should be guided 
by political interest, but, rather, by the only purpose of 
providing greater financial stability. Finally, as of point 
c), participants supported the undoubted relevance of the 
harmonization of rules across EU countries, especially 
for cross-border operating banks. 
The trade-off between authorities’ discretion and inves-
tors’ predictability was also addressed when discussing 
the risk of potential financial instability given by the 
BRRD. Participants admitted the presence of possible 
unforeseeable consequences coming out of direct appli-
cation of the BRRD, such as financial contagion. On this 
point, clearer rules regarding limits on TLAC held by 
other financial institutions should be clearly specified so 
as to guarantee the effective functioning of firebreaks in 
case of contagion. 
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An additional reason for more precise information was 
identified in the distinction between MREL and TLAC. 
While some of the participants suggested that a reconcili-
ation among the two would benefit financial markets by 
reducing uncertainty and possibility of regulatory arbi-
trage, others did not fully support this view and acknowl-
edged important differences between the two. 
One final comment that was raised suggested the need 
for a greater disclosure of information regarding how 
BRRD should operate when the economy is not in 
steady state. Some participants stressed that some recent 
BRRD failures might not be completely imputable to the 
lack of information, but, rather, to the transitory phase 
that the resolution regime is still undergoing and to an 
environment characterized by markets that are still not 
completely operating. Banks’ balance sheets are still not 
completely recovered from the financial crisis and some 
banks are still building up their equity buffer. 
 
Liquidity Support and Exit Strategy in the 
New Resolution Phase
The fourth and last panel of the conference highlighted 
regulators’ growing concerns over the liquidity issues that 
could arise following the introduction of banking reso-
lution standards. Participants claimed that, while bail-in 
requirements such as MREL and TLAC address solvency 
concerns, they might have backfire effects on banks’ 
liquidity, especially when it cannot cover its needs using 
the Eurosystem as a liquidity backstop. 
Participants stressed that the liquidity planned for reso-
lution and implemented by the BRRD might not be suf-
ficient to address all of banks liquidity needs, both when 
the system gets at its full regime, and especially now 
during its ad-interim process, when the amount of non-
performing assets are still consistent and the resolution 
funds is yet to be completed. Participants stressed that, 
if banks lack collateral, they cannot resort to the Euro-
system monetary policy operations and governments are 
left with more intrusive solutions to their liquidity needs, 
depending on how systemic the crisis is and on the shape 
of the involved banks. These measures may vary from the 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance, to fiscal backstop, reso-
lution fund and all the way down to capital controls.
Other participants expressed their concerns on whether 
the existing measures to deal with liquidity shocks are, in 
fact, usable when necessary. They argue that tools such as 
the liquidity covering ratio (LCR), for example, might not 
be used without causing panic reactions.
Finally, participants stressed the importance of using pri-
vate sources of funding that minimize moral hazard costs 
and to rely on the public sector as a backstop mechanism 
only when private money is not available and with the 
aim of providing market confidence and of promoting 
more stable funding to systemic institutions.
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